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T he

negotiation of several mega - treaties in 2015,

including the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), the Trans-Atlantic Trade
and Investment Partnership (TTIP), the EU-Canada Comprehensive
Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA), and other regional agreements, has generated substantial public discussion about the protections and privileges afforded to multinational enterprises through the
investor–state dispute settlement (ISDS) mechanism in these treaties.
ISDS has increasingly raised concerns among certain governments and
civil society groups, particularly as a growing number of ISDS cases
involve investors challenging a range of governmental measures taken
in good faith and in the public interest, including measures related to
environmental protection, public health and safety, and financial stability. Even representatives of international businesses – the purported
beneficiaries of these texts – have voiced concerns about the costs of
ISDS proceedings, uncertainty regarding outcomes of disputes, and
an absence of rules to ensure the independence and impartiality of
arbitrators.
The TPP negotiating parties deflected the underlying concerns about
ISDS by assuring constituents that ISDS would be included in the
TPP in an improved “21st century” form, resolving the controversial
elements. When the text of the TPP was released in November 2015,
it became evident that while the ISDS mechanism in the TPP includes
some changes around the margins, its basic elements remain generally
unchanged. Therefore, a cost-benefit analysis of ISDS remains essential. There are two fundamental questions: Is ISDS effective or necessary to produce its purported benefits? And do the potential benefits
outweigh the costs? An analysis of ISDS as included in the TPP shows
that the costs outweigh the alleged benefits, and alternative strategies
should be employed to protect investors and promote the rule of law.

Is ISDS Effective or Necessary to Produce Its
Purported Benefits?
ISDS is said to provide three core benefits: (1) increasing investment
flows by providing potential investors additional security and protections, (2) depoliticizing investment disputes, and (3) improving the rule
of law in the host state.
The first question is, therefore, is ISDS necessary or even effective in
increasing investment flows and, if so, are these investments beneficial
and to whom?

10

AIB Insights

After roughly ten years of scholarly and practical inquiry with increasingly rigorous methodologies, there is no strong evidence that international investment agreements (IIAs), much less ISDS, impact investment
flows. The various empirical studies examining trends in FDI flows establish no clear statistical relationship between signing a treaty and receiving increased investment (see, e.g., Berger et al, 2013; Sauvant & Sachs,
2009). Similarly, a survey of in-house counsel in large US multinationals
revealed that IIAs do not play any significant role in foreign investment
decisions (Yackee, 2010). Some of the largest cross-border investment
flows take place in the absence of treaties, including between the US
and China, India, Brazil and the United Kingdom; in fact, Brazil, a major
capital importer and exporter, has no treaties in force with ISDS, nor
does it plan to include ISDS in its future agreements.
Importantly, even the basic presumption that increased investment
flows of all types will necessarily lead to positive development outcomes
in the host country is wrong, since the benefits depend on the details of
each investment (such as the sector, technologies transferred, and jobs
created, among other factors). Indeed, the Overseas Private Investment
Corporation (OPIC), a US government entity which provides political
risk insurance to foreign investors, recognizes that only certain types
of investment create development benefits. OPIC therefore screens
investments seeking coverage to ensure that at least a minimum development benefit is realized, and it prohibits support for projects that will
result in harms in the host country.
Even less certain is the extent to which increased outward investment
would generate benefits for the home country and its constituents.
While outward investment could result in increased capital income and
tax revenues at home, it can also result in outsourcing of jobs and tax
structuring to decrease tax liabilities. Again, OPIC and other governmentprovided risk insurances recognize these potentially negative consequences and shape their insurance policies and decisions accordingly.
The TPP, like other treaties and the majority of tribunals interpreting
those agreements, ignores the development impacts of investments
that are afforded the benefits under the treaty, and it provides premium-free political risk insurance to investments irrespective of their
development impacts or negative effects at home or abroad.
Second, proponents of ISDS argue that it is important for “depoliticizing” investment disputes, freeing host states from diplomatic pressure
and the threat of “gunboat diplomacy” and home states from having
to advocate on behalf of their domestic firms. In fact, whether a home
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state gets involved in an investor’s dispute with its host state does
not vary based on whether or not there is a treaty with ISDS in place;
a recent study found no evidence that countries that have signed
an investment treaty with the United States face any less diplomatic
pressure in investment disputes (Jandhyala et al., 2015). Notably, the
TPP does not prohibit home states from exercising diplomatic pressure
before, during, or after an investment claim has been filed.
A third argument for ISDS is that this supra-national system strengthens
the rule of law of treaty parties by reinforcing the importance of legal
commitments. Yet, to the contrary, ISDS and investment treaties have
been shown to weaken domestic rule of law (Ginsburg, 2005; see also
Sattorova, 2014). The myriad reasons for this are elaborated below; the
TPP, in its modifications, makes no attempt to correct for these failures.
Therefore, none of the purported core benefits of ISDS (increased investment flows, depoliticizing disputes, or improving the rule of law in host
states) has been effectively realized by the inclusion of ISDS in investment treaties. Proponents of the system, including the investors and the
lawyers and arbitrators who have an interest in the system’s survival and
growth, continue to tout these claims as the reason the mechanism is
necessary, including in the TPP, but the empirical evidence continues
to reveal that ISDS is neither effective nor necessary for achieving these
benefits; indeed, these objectives can be realized through other means,
as discussed below.

Do the Purported Benefits of Investment Treaties
Outweigh Their Costs?
The second fundamental question is what ISDS costs host governments
and their constituents, and whether the purported benefits outweigh
the costs. These costs include negative impacts on (a) domestic law,
policy, and institutions, and (b) costs of litigation, liability, and loss of
regulatory space.

Costs Related to Domestic Law, Policy, and Institutions
Many ISDS claims are actually domestic law issues of administrative,
contract, tort, or constitutional law that are merely removed from
domestic legal institutions and processes and taken up in a parallel and
specialized system available only to foreign investors, with fewer procedural barriers and greater substantive protections. A foreign investor
seeking to challenge conduct of the US government, for example, can
take a substantive or procedural due process action, a contract action,
an action governed by the Administrative Procedures Act, or a tort
claim against the government, and decide whether to bring it under
domestic law or as a violation of a treaty’s fair and equitable treatment
(FET) provision — or both, in some cases. If the investor opts for ISDS
instead of pursuing the domestic law claim, it can bypass all otherwise
applicable procedural rules that may have complicated or frustrated
its claim, including domestic rules of standing, statutes of limitation,
requirements of exhaustion, doctrines of abstention, limits on judicial
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review, limits on available remedies, and rules regarding discovery,
privilege, and evidence. Such domestic rules have been developed and
refined over time and reflect important policy choices about the scope
of public and private rights.
In addition to creating a parallel and preferential legal system for foreign
investors, ISDS actually creates and protects new property rights at a
cost to the broader public interest. In a growing number of cases, tribunals have created and restated a rule that specific representations or
assurances given by government representatives can give rise to investors’ “legitimate expectations,” which are protected under the treaty’s
FET obligation from government interference. Tribunals have protected
“legitimate expectations” even when the official who made the relevant
commitment did not have actual authority to bind the government
or when the commitment did not comply with necessary procedural
requirements. While the TPP states that a breach of investors’“legitimate
expectations” will not, standing alone, constitute a violation of the FET
obligation, it suggests that investors’ “legitimate expectations” can still
be a factor considered by tribunals when determining whether a state
has breached its FET obligations, effectively creating and protecting
“rights” that would not be recognized under domestic law.
From the rule of law perspective, ISDS also upsets the separation and
balance of powers. If domestic legislation sets the scope of administrative officials’ ability to grant or define property rights, and administrative officials exceed that authority, a decision by a tribunal giving
legal effect to the administrative officials’ actions overrides legislative
dictates. Moreover, many projects that trigger investor–state disputes
are projects in which negative impacts are concentrated at the local
level, but benefits (e.g., increased tax revenue) are realized at the national level. Through its protection of “legitimate expectations,” ISDS allows
investors to transform non-binding representations that favor their
interests into rights protected under international law, weakening the
voice and power of regulatory institutions and affected communities
that might otherwise shape or constrain investors’ proposed projects.
This parallel legal system also undermines the role of domestic institutions and courts in their core responsibilities of developing, interpreting, and applying the law. Particularly in common law jurisdictions
where courts play a crucial role in shaping the substantive contours of
the law over time, the ability of investors to sidestep domestic courts
through recourse to ISDS effectively undercuts those domestic institutions’ abilities to fulfill their important functions.
The closed nature of ISDS disputes further exacerbates the problems
created by this parallel legal system. Despite the public importance of
these cases, disputes under most existing and many new IIAs are still
litigated and decided or settled behind closed doors. While the TPP
requires significant transparency of ISDS proceedings, and authorizes
(but does not require) ISDS tribunals to accept amicus curiae submissions from non-parties to the dispute, the interests and rights of
non-parties can remain marginalized. Even if they will be affected by
the treaty claims and outcomes, non-disputing parties have no legal
rights to actually participate in the proceedings or shape the outcomes
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of the disputes. While domestic law often has a number of ways in
which interested and affected individuals and entities are protected,
including by requiring judicial oversight of settlements, allowing those
affected to participate in proceedings, or requiring dismissal of claims
when such individuals or entities cannot be joined, ISDS, in contrast,
contains no such safeguards.

staggering sums, such as the $1.8 billion award in Occidental v. Ecuador
and the $50 billion combined award in three closely related cases
against Russia. While the TPP does contain some relatively new provisions regarding allocation of costs and compensation in awards, those
changes do not result in any meaningful changes for states in terms of
exposure to costs of litigation and liability.

The system of providing special protections for investors is based on
the presumption that foreign investors face bias and discrimination in
domestic legal systems. In reality, these fears are overstated. Only eight
of the more than 600 known ISDS cases have successfully alleged a violation of the national treatment obligation (protecting foreign investors
against discrimination in favor of domestic investors)1; and in not one of
them did the tribunal find that there was intentional nationality-based
discrimination against the foreign investor. Rather, in those eight cases,
liability was usually based on strategic protection of domestic producers that negatively affected the foreign investor claimant, measures that
can be and have been challenged in inter-state trade dispute settlement mechanisms. In fact, studies show that foreign investors generally
have greater power and influence over their host governments than
domestic investors, particularly as governments around the world are
competing for capital. The rational for establishing a privileged legal
system for foreign investors is therefore based on an illusory threat.

While the costs that result from a loss of policy space are more difficult to assess and calculate, they are potentially even more damaging
in their welfare effects. As Jonathan Bonnitcha’s recent analysis of the
economic impacts of investment treaties suggests (Bonnitcha, 2014),
investment protection through ISDS can discourage economically
efficient government regulation in the public interest.

“

Given that ISDS is not effective or necessary to achieve its intended
benefits and that the costs are so substantial, its inclusion in treaties,
including in the TPP, is unjustified. Yet if ISDS is removed from treaties,
what recourse would foreign investors have for harm suffered due to
host state conduct? Fortunately, there are other less costly and more
appropriate mechanisms that can protect investor rights.
The first place
for recourse for
foreign investors
should
remain
the domestic law
system of the
host countries,
where all other domestic investors and stakeholders resolve their
disputes. Debates around ISDS are premised on the false assumption
that domestic systems are inadequate; in fact, many domestic legal
systems do function well, particularly when exhaustion is required,
giving governments the ability to correct lower level errors. In countries
where legal systems and processes are weak, the focus of international
agreements should be on strengthening those legal systems to ensure
their robust development for all users, not undermining their development by creating a parallel process and set of rules for select foreign
investors.

Given that ISDS is not effective or necessary to achieve its intended
benefits … its inclusion in treaties, including in the TPP, is unjustified  

Thus, despite the assertion that ISDS strengthens the rule of law, the
evidence is very much to the contrary. ISDS exacerbates inequality
under the law by giving foreign investors access to a parallel and preferential legal system; diminishes the role of various government actors
and institutions; and poses challenges to transparency and public
participation. Moreover, to the extent that IIAs make it less risky for
foreign investors to invest in jurisdictions with little respect for the rule
of law, ISDS reduces incentives for governments to improve their investment climate, procedural fairness, domestic legal systems, and other
aspects of the rule of law that would benefit domestic stakeholders as
well. Overall, ISDS risks undermining rule of law objectives by upsetting
and usurping the fundamental processes for developing, enforcing,
and applying the law.

Costs of Litigation, Liability, and Loss of Regulatory Space
Finally, there are the actual costs of ISDS litigation and liability and those
that result from the loss of policy space.
The costs of litigation and liability can be significant. Average costs of
defending cases now approach $5 million, and even victorious states
often are left to bear those fees (see Hodgson, 2014). ISDS awards,
estimated by some to be roughly $75 million on average,2 can reach
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Moving Forward: What Are the Alternatives?
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”

Second, investors can purchase additional protections through political risk insurance, which is designed to price political risk on the market,
sending a signal to both the investors and the host states about the
security of investments in the host jurisdictions.3 If a particular jurisdiction has a higher cost for political risk insurance, the host government will
likely have the incentive to take steps to improve the investment climate
for foreign investors, thereby strengthening rule of law incentives.
A third avenue is through existing human rights mechanisms such as
regional mechanisms established in Europe (the European Court of
Human Rights), the Americas (the Inter-American Commission and
Court for the Protection of Human Rights), and Africa (the African
Court and Commission on Human and People’s Rights).4 These mecha-

Vol. 16, No. 1

nisms are available to those aggrieved by government expropriations,
discrimination, or denial of justice. To the extent that investors (or
states) consider these mechanisms to be inadequate for resolving such
claims, then as with inadequate domestic legal systems, the parties
should take steps, through treaties and other collaborative means, to
strengthen these human rights mechanisms for all stakeholders.
Fourth, as a last resort state parties may agree to treaty-based state-state
dispute resolution mechanisms to resolve allegations of discriminatory
or egregious treatment. There are plenty of precedents for robust, wellfunctioning state-state dispute resolution mechanisms including that
of the World Trade Organization.5 Similar legal mechanisms can be used
for resolution of investment disputes.
While it’s laudable that the drafters of the major mega-treaties have
recognized the need for reform of the traditional ISDS model, much
more could and should have been done in the TPP to create alternatives to a fundamentally flawed system. The marginal changes that
were made to ISDS in the TPP do not address the significant and justified concerns about that mechanism. The logic and evidence point
to the need to drop ISDS altogether, and instead to strengthen and
support national judicial processes and the rule of law, complemented,
as necessary, through international human rights protections and stateto-state dispute resolution.
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